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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-CoNcREss10NAL PoWERs-VALIDITY oF THE 1953
SuBMERGED LANDs ACT-In 1947 and 1950 the Supreme Court held that the
coastal states had no property interest in the submerged lands lying seaward
from the low water mark, whether ownership of this land was held by the
state prior1 to admission into the Union or not,2 and that the federal government had paramount rights in and power over this land, including the resources
of the soil beneath it. In 1953 Congress passed, and the President signed,
the Submerged Lands Act,3 which vested in the coastal states title to and
proprietary power over this land. Alabama and Rhode Island petitioned the
Court for leave to file complaints against two of the coastal states as to actions
taken and proposed to be taken under this act. Held, per curiam, two justices

United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 70 S.Ct. 918 (1950).
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 67 S.Ct. 1658 (1947).
3 67 Stat. L. 29 (1953), 1 U.S.C. Cong. and Adm. News 29 (1953).
1

2
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dissenting, motion denied.4 Under article IV, section 3, clause 2 of the
Constitution,5 Congress has an unlimited power to dispose of any kind of
property belonging to the United States.6 Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272,
74 S.Ct. 481 (1954).
There were three major arguments against the validity of the Submerged
Lands Act. The petitioning states first asserted that there was no subject
matter on which article IV, section 3 might operate, since the federal government has never claimed ownership of these lands. 7 It is apparent, however,
that this contention has no application to the lands lying seaward from the
Texas shore, for the Court earlier found that ownership of these lands passed
from Texas to the United States upon the admission of Texas to the Union.8
Neither is it difficult to find that the United States has a property interest in
the lands lying seaward from the other coastal states. The Court has held
that the United States has the right to extract the minerals from beneath these
submerged lands; 9 this is certainly property within the meaning of article IV,
section 3.10 In the Texas case11 it was held that Texas must have relinquished
its ownership of these lands to the United States in order to enter the Union
on an equal footing with the other states. In his dissent in the present case,
Justice Douglas asks how Texas may be made a gift of these lands and still
remain on such an equal footing. Prior to 1950 the equal footing doctrine
had had little application in the area of property rights, the rule being that
all property owned by a territory passed to the new state upon admission.12
4 Consistently with earlier. holdings, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,
43 S.Ct. 597 (1923), the Court could have refused to entertain these complaints on
the ground of lack of sufficient interest in the petitioning states. The status of this
"party in interest" doctrine as a requisite to the jurisdiction of the Court is in somtl
doubt; if the Court feels that the case may be easily disposed of on other grounds, or
if it appears desirable to rule on the point at issue, the rule may not be applied. Compare
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948),
with Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 72 S.Ct. 394 (1952). See also
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031 (1953).
5 "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States•
• • •" U.S. CONST., art. IV, §3, cl. 2.
6 The language of the Court in the California case contained a clear hint that an
act of Congress in this area would be valid and binding on the courts, although the hypothetical statute there referred to was of a different character. See United States v.
California, note 2 supra, at 27.
7 The Court struck from the decree proposed by the government in the California
case the claim of the United States to proprietary rights in this land. See United States
v. Texas, note I supra, at 724, note. One of the arguments employed by the opponents
of the bill in Congress was that the United States had no property interest in these lands,
and that thus the result would be a nullity. See H. Rep. No. 215, 83d Cong., 1st sess.,
p. 117 (1953).
8 United States v. Texas, note I supra.
9 United States v. California, note 2 supra.
10 It is of course not necessary, in order for art. IV, §3 to be applicable, that the
property involved be tangible. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288,
56 S.Ct. 466 (1936) (electrical energy). See also 50 Mica. L. REv. 114 at 122 (1951).
11 United States v. Texas, note I supra.
12 Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. ( 44 U.S.) 212 (1845).
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In that year the Court held that since the other coastal states had been found
not to own this type of property, Texas could not assert title consistently with
the equal footing doctrine.13 If it follows from the present case that Congress
could have deeded these lands to Texas immediately after the admission of
Texas to the Union, the emptiness and uselessness of that novel and doubtful14 application of the equal footing doctrine is obvious. However, the
question is largely hypothetical; since the Submerged Lands Act gives to all
the coastal states the lands lying seaward from their shores, the states remain
equal in this respect.
The third attack on the validity of the Submerged Lands Act was the most
serious. Conceding that the United States does have some property interest
in these lands, so as to bring article IV, section 3 into operation, nevertheless
considerations such as the role played by the United States as a sovereign
member of the family of nations, and the vast importance to United States
security of control over these lands and the oil beneath them, demand that
this property and these powers be kept in the United States.15 This contention is buttressed by language in the California16 and Texas cases, the
latter having held that "although dominium and imperium are normally separable and separate, this is an instance where property interests are so subordinated to the rights of sovereignty as to follow sovereignty."17 A sufficient
answer to this argument would seem to be the fact that the Submerged Lands
Act expressly reserves to the United States all its sovereign authority over
these lands and the power to exercise that authority, the coastal states being
given little more than bare title to the lands and the right to take the oil. If
the exercise of this right proves an interference with the exercise of the power
of the United States, the wording of the act makes it clear, if this is necessary,18 that the interests of the United States will be supreme.19 Thus Con13 United States v. Texas, note I supra.
14 An analysis and criticism of the application of the equal footing doctrine in the
Texas case is given in 50 MICH. L. REv. 114 at 119 et seq. (1951). For a summary
of the history and development of this doctrine, see CoNS'nTUT.ION OF THB UNIT.ED STATES
OF AMErocA, Corwin ed., S. Doc. No. 170, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 697 et seq. (1953).
15 This was the major constitutional argument expressed by the minority on the
Senate Interior Committee. S. Rep. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st sess., part II, p. 11 (1953).
16 ''What this Government does, or even what the states do, anywhere in the ocean,
is a subject upon which the nation may enter into and assume treaty or similar international obligations. The very oil about which the state and nation here contend might
well become the subject of international dispute and settlement." United States v.
California, note 2 supra, at 35.
17 United States v. Texas, note I supra, at 719.
18 Jn his dissent in the California case, Justice Frankfurter, arguing for state ownership of these lands, observed: ''This is not a situation where an exercise of national power
is actively and presently interfered with. In such a case, the inherent power of a federal
court of equity may be invoked to prevent or remove the obstruction." United States v.
California, note 2 supra, at 44.
19 "The United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights in and powers
of regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes
of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs, all of which shall
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gress has defined clearly the distinction between ownership and sovereignty,
a distinction which the Court has been unable or unwilling to make,20 and
has declared these two concepts to be entirely separate. The principle that
the power of Congress under article IV, section 3 is without limitation appears to be solidly entrenched, and in view of the summary treatment given
to the controversy in the present case, that principle is not likely to be attacked
for some time.21
William D. Keeler

be paramount to, but shall not be deemed to include, proprietary rights of ownership, or
the rights of management, administration, leasing, use, and development of the lands and
natural resources which are specifically recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in
and assigned to the respective States and others by section 3 of this Act." 67 Stat. L. 29,
§6 (1953), I U.S.C. Cong. and Adm. News 29 (1953).
20 Texas had asserted only title to these lands and the right to extract the oil, conceding the sovereign power of the United States. over these lands. As an example of
the confusion between the concepts of imperium and dominium, consider the following
language from the majority opinion in the Texas case: "The 'equal footing' clause prevents
extension of the sovereignty of a State into a domain of political and sovereign power
of the United States from which the other States have been excluded, just as it prevents
a contraction of sovereignty which would produce inequality among the States." United
States v. Texas, note I supra, at 719.
21 See Justice Reed, concurring in the principal case at 277: "Such congressional
determination as the legislation here in question is not subject to judicial review."

